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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(1) Will it be impossible for landlords to absorb the cost of bringing
their units into compliance with the housing code, thus driving addi-
tional low-cost housing off the market?"
(2) If this decision does result in the decrease of low-cost housing,
then who shall develop, own, and manage such housing?
(3) If private enterprise is unable or unwilling to finance these mas-
sive repairs, should the government assume full responsibility for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of a nationwide system of
low-income housing?
It must be remembered that the only justification for this decision
is that it will serve to "increase rather than decrease the stock of habita-
ble housing in the District of Columbia."'" In thie event this result does
not follow, the justification collapses, and there is no further policy basis
for the decision.
0. MAX GARDNER III
Medical Jurisprudence-Determining the Time of Death of the Heart
Transplant Donor
Over the past twenty years medical science has made phenomenal
strides in the areas of resuscitation, life support, and organ transplanta-
tion.' With the first human heart transplant 2 the medical and legal
communities were forced to re-assess their positions on many legal and
ethical issues. Because the heart is a vital and non-paired organ, a heart
transplant necessarily results in the death of the donor. Also, it is
necessary to remove the heart from the transplant donor as soon as
possible after respiratory failure occurs. Because the heart tissue begins
to deteriorate immediately upon termination of its oxygen supply, delay
"The Robinson court concluded that this danger is largely imagined, citing only Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies
and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
"No. 24,508, at 27-28.
'See Harvard Medical Shool Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
Report: A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
2The first human heart transplant was performed on Dec. 3, 1967 by Dr. Christiaan Barnard
on Louis Washkansky at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. R. PORzio, THE
TRNSPLANT AGE 17 (1969).
3See, e.g., Timmes, The Cardiac Surgeon's Viewpoint, in THE MOMENT OF DEATH 14 (A.




in removal minimizes the chance of survival in the recipient.' Since the
type of patient likely to be a potential donor is one who has suffered
irreversible and irreparable brain damage' and whose breathing is being
maintained artificially by a respirator,' the validity of the traditional
criteria for determining the time of death-cessation of heart beat and
respiration 7-has been seriously challenged. Mindful of the current state
of the arts of artificial life support and transplantation, the medical
profession has quietly adopted irreversible coma or "brain death" as an
alternative means of establishing the death of a human being.'
The heart can be removed from the "medically dead" donor while
it continues to be oxygenated by artificially maintained respiration.
However, since most state laws continue to recognize the cessation of
heart beat and respiration as the legal test for determining the time of
death, the stage is set for a direct confrontation between the medical and
the legal criteria. A strict application of the traditional criteria would
implicate as tortfeasors, or worse, surgeons who remove viable hearts
from patients whose vital functions are being maintained artificially.' In
Tucker v. Lower,10 a wrongful death action" stemming from the world's
nineteenth human heart transplant, a Virginia trial court squarely faced
the issue of what test should be used to determine the time of death. The
4Editorial, What and When Is Death?, 204 J.A.M.A. 539 (1968).
'American College of Cardiology, Bethesda Conference Report: Cardiac and Other Organ
Transplantation in the Setting of Transplant Science as a National Effort, 22 Am. J. CARDIOLOGY
896, 906 (1968).
'Shapiro, Criteria for Determining that Death Has Occurred: The Philadelphia Protocol, 16
J. FOR. MED. 1, 2-3 (1969). The author advocates turning the respirator off, declaring the patient
dead, and then turning the respirator back on to preserve the organs for transplantation.
7Haney & Salas, Problems In Anatomical Gifts, 18 J. FOR. MED. 140, 142 (1971), demon-
strate that even in the more primitive societies heartbeat and respiration are generally the criteria
used to determine death.
'Curran, Legal and Medical Death-Kansas Takes the First Step, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED.
260 (1971). The author concludes that the still-developing field of transplantation should not be
locked into strict legal requirements. See also Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra note 1; Timmes, supra note 3.
'Letter from Loren F. Taylor, M.D., J.D., Jan. I1, 1971, in 215 J.A.M.A. 296 (1971); Note,
Gifts-The Anatomical Gifts Act of North Carolina, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 155, 161
(1969). The Deputy District Attorney for the City of Los Angeles maintains that murder is
technically committed in many transplant situations because of the uncertainty of the legal defini-
tion of death. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1968, § A, at 23, col. I.
"°No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972).
"The plaintiffs also alleged malpractice and what amounted to civil conspiracy. The court
concluded that no prima facie case of malpractice had been established and the jury found for
defendants on the civil conspiracy allegation.
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trial judge resolved this volatile issue by allowing the jury to select the
death criteria from a list provided by the court-including the complete
and irreversible loss of all function of the brain. The purpose of this
note12 is to examine the medical and legal ramifications of this instruc-
tion . 3
On May 24, 1968, Bruce 0. Tucker, age 54, was brought uncon-
scious to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia Hospi-
tal. He had suffered a fall, sustaining severe head injuries. After cranial
surgery Tucker was placed on a respirator which kept him "mechani-
cally alive." At this time the treating physician noted that "[h]is prog-
nosis for recovery is nil and death is imminent." A neurologist was
called upon to obtain an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording to de-
termine the state of the patient's brain activity. A single EEG recording
was made which indicated no brain activity. The neurologist found no
clinical evidence of viability and no evidence of cortical activity. Based
upon this examination, he was of the opinion that the patient was then
dead from a neurological standpoint. At the same time the neurologist
also found that the decedent's heart was beating and that his body
temperature, pulse, and blood pressure were all normal for a patient in
his condition. The patient showed no evidence of being able to breathe
spontaneously. The respirator was doing all the breathing. The neurolo-
gist was of the opinion the decedent's condition was irreversible at the
time the patient was admitted to the hospital. Later in the day of May
25, in anticipation of a transplantation of Tucker's heart and kidneys,
the respirator was turned off, and the patient was pronounced dead.
IThe complex issues of euthanasia and organ donation are beyond the scope of this note and
will be dealt with only as they relate to the topic of selecting criteria for determining the time of
death.
3Instruction No. 7. The court instructs the jury that you shall determine the time
of death in this case by using the following definition of the nature of death. Death is a
cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist. Under the law, death is not continuing but
occurs at a precise time and that time must be established according to the facts of each
specific case.
In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under the facts and circumstances
of this case, you may consider the following elements, none of which should necessarily
be considered controlling, although you may feel under the evidence that one of [sic]
more of these conditions are controlling: the time of the total stoppage of the circulation
of the blood; the time of the total cessation of the other vital functions consequent
thereto, such as respiration and pulsation; the time of complete and irreversible loss of
all function of the brain; and, whether or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous
or were being maintained artificially or mechanically.
Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972).
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Until the respirator was cut off, Tucker maintained vital signs of
life-that is, he maintained, with mechanical assistance, normal body
temperature, pulse, blood pressure, and respiration. In addition to the
evidence relating to the viable state of Tucker's organs at the time he
was pronounced dead, the plaintiff presented competent evidence that
Tucker could have "lived" at least one more day with the aid of a
respirator if his heart and kidneys had not been removed." The court
concluded'5 that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for
recovery under the Virginia Death by Wrongful Act Statutes. 6
The administrator of Tucker's estate brought a wrongful death
action against the surgeons who participated in the transplant of
Tucker's heart and kidneys. Plaintiff alleged that because certain vital
signs were normal, the donor was alive at the time the heart and kidneys
were removed. The defendants contended that because the brain of the
donor had suffered total and irreversible damage, he was medically and
legally dead several hours before the heart and kidneys were removed.
The judge, apparently influenced by the expert testimony presented by
the defendants, allowed the jury to select the criteria for determining the
time of death. The factual issues that the jury was allowed to consider
included the determination of the time of complete and irreversible loss
of all function of the brain and whether the vital functions exhibited by
the patient before the respirator was turned off were being maintained
artificially. 7 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, apparently
accepting the time of complete loss of all function of the brain as a
criterion for determining the time of death."
The cases show that the legal criteria for determining the time of
death have remained basically unchanged over the past century. The
chief criterion for diagnosing the time of death has been the cessation
of the vital functions of respiration and circulation. 9 However, most of
"This summary of the facts of the case (Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 Ct. of Law & Eq.,
Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) and its final disposition were obtained from the following sources:
the allied papers (pleadings, motions, etc.) of the case; an unreported memorandum opinion written
by the trial judge, the Honorable A. Christian Compton; letters from Judge Compton to the writer,
July 25, 1972 and Sept. 13, 1972.
sTucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (unreported
trial court opinion at 6-7).
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-633 to 646.1 (1972).
"See note 13 supra.
18Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (judgment
filed by the court).
"E.g., In re Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, - , 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968).
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the cases in which the question has arisen have involved the issue of
survivorship for purposes of inheritance, termination of joint tenancies,
or determination of rights in the proceeds of insurance policies. Appar-
ently, no court has ever applied a test for determining the time of death
where the issue was the tort liability of a physician."0 In the property-
rights cases, the courts have looked to the medical profession for a
"definition of death." In support of their application of the traditional
criterion of the cessation of heart beat and respiration, the courts have
relied on Black's Law Dictionary,"' on expert medical testimony,2 and
on judicial notice of prevailing medical practice.2z The criterion is
sometimes restated as "the cessation of all vital functions,' 2 4 and occa-
sional refinements, such as the accompanying permanent cessation of
the action of the central nervous system, are sometimes added;25 but,
basically, the traditional criteria have remained unaltered.
In Smith v. Smith8 the first attempt to induce a court to recognize
the brain death test was made. There husband and wife received fatal
injuries in the same accident, but the wife, who was in a coma due to
brain injury, lived seventeen days longer than the husband. The court
refused to agree that both husband and wife had died at the same time:
"We take judicial notice that one breathing, though unconscious, is not
dead." In a similar California case, In re Estate of Schmidt,20 the trial
court's memorandum opinion stated that, in the opinion of the medical
2OSee, e.g., I M. HouTs, COURTROOM MEDICINE: DEATH § 1.03(2), at 31-32 (1971). The
author notes critically the scarcity of judicial attempts, other than in property cases, to define
death. See also Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 32 (1969).21Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); In re Estate of Schmidt,
261 Cal. App. 2d 262, _ 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d
371, ____ 215 P.2d 478, 481-82 (1950); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961). These
cases applied the following definition of death from BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed.
1968): "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon,
such as respiration, pulsation, etc."
22Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1952).
2Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 210, 280 N.W. 641, 643 (1938).
21Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 P.2d 542, 547 (Cal. App. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
33 Cal. 2d 289, 201 P.2d 811 (1949); see United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 4, 427 P.2d 67, 71
(1967).
2'Gugel's Adm'r v. Orth's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 591, 594, 236 S.W.2d 460,461-62 (1950) (based upon
expert medical testimony); In re Stuertz' Estate, 124 Neb. 149, 153, 245 N.W. 412, 414 (1932).
2'229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
Rld. at 589, 317 S.W.2d at 281.
'1261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968).
[Vol. 51
TIME OF DEATH
experts, death might be the inability to be resuscitated or an irreversible
coma. The trial court ignored this evidence however, and used the tradi-
tional criterion as outlined in Black's Law Dictionary-cessation of
heart beat and respiration. Appellants argued that the traditional defini-
tion was anachronistic in view of the recent medical developments relat-
ing to heart transplants, and that the trial court should have accepted
the inability to be resuscitated as the definition of death. The appellate
court affirmed the definition used by the trial court and stated that the
definition offered by the medical experts, though interesting, would not
dispose of the survivorship issue at bar because there was no evidence
as to the resuscitability of both spouses."9 Thus, a survey of the existing
case law demonstrates that most courts apply the traditional medical
criterion"° and that one court would possibly be willing to apply non-
traditional criteria (established by expert medical testimony) if the op-
portunity were properly presented.
In 1970 Kansas codified a "definition of death"'" in an attempt
to achieve the related goals of obtaining viable organs for transplanta-
tion and of protecting transplant surgeons from civil and criminal liabil-
ity.32 The statute permits use of an alternative definition of death. A
2 1d. at , 67 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
"'See, e.g., Comment, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 674, 688 (1972).
"The text of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971) providing alternative definitions of
death is as follows:
Definition of death. A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in
the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the
passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered
hopeless; and, in this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased;
or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have
occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced
before artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated
and before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this state,
including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
""Letter from Taylor, supra note 9. Dr. Taylor is a physician and lawyer who assisted in
drafting the Kansas statute.
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subject is legally dead when either of the following conditions exist:
respiration and cardiac function have ceased or spontaneous brain func-
tion is absent. Apparently, the means for determining whether either of
these events has occurred are to be left to the standards of the medical
profession. There are some in the medical and legal professions who do
not support a legislative statement of the criteria to be used in determin-
ing the time of death, and a debate has arisen over the need for legisla-
tion such as that enacted in Kansas.3 Those opposed to the statute
fear that the law will stultify medical advances as more becomes known
about transplantation and life-support mechanics. They would prefer to
rely on the courts to determine the issue as one of fact on a case-by-
case basis based on expert medical evidence.3 4 Opposed to such a view
are those who desire legislative protection for those doctors performing
transplants, especially heart transplants, on patients with irreversible
brain damage. 5 Although no cases have yet appeared interpreting the
statute, it appears that the wording is flexible enough to accommodate
the objectives of both camps. The statute provides an alternate "defini-
tion of death" in allowing the "absence of spontaneous brain func-
tion' '16 to be an indicator of death, but it does not make rigid the means
by which the absence of spontaneous brain function is to be determined.
The courts are required by the statute to rely upon "ordinary standards
of medical practice" 7 in evaluating medical opinion as to the time of
death and the criteria used in making the time-of-death determination.
Since the Kansas statute is the first legislative definition of death, its
passage is not necessarily indicative of a general acceptance by the law
of non-traditional death criteria.
"See, e.g., Curran, supra note 8; Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death-An Appraisal,
285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 946 (1971) (criticizing the Kansas death statute on the grounds that it will
hamper medical science); Mills, The Kansas Death Statute: Bold and Innovative, 285 Naw ENo.
J. MED. 968 (1971) (concluding that the Kansas statute will protect transplant physicians legally
while allowing flexibility in death determination).
31See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33. In Note, Human Organ Transplantation: Some Medico.
Legal Pitfalls For Transplant Surgeons, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 134, 136 n.15 (1970) the following
observation is made: "Many physicians have shown a resistance to pressing for a change in the
legal definition of death, feeling that a legal enactment would necessarily be rigid and restrictive.
There is sentiment that the danger of effective prosecution is remote because expert testimony not
supporting the brain death criteria would be impossible to obtain."
"See. e.g., Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 34, at 156 (suggesting that society should
assume through legislation some of the risk now being borne by transplant physicians).




Another statutory enactment closely related to the 1970 Kansas
statute is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), s adopted by
more than forty states and the District of Columbia.3 9 The UAGA is
an attempt to legislate a more efficient means of obtaining organs for
the purpose of transplantation." The importance of the Act to the de-
bate over what criterion should be used in determining the time of death
lies not in what it says but in what it fails to say. The UAGA specifically
omits a definition of death. The Commissioners decided that this was
primarily a medical question currently in a state of flux rather than an
issue for legal codification. 41 The Act provides simply that "[t]he time
of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor at
his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. '42 The
Kansas statute was adopted in part to complement the UAGA as en-
acted in Kansas by providing the definition of death that was purposely
omitted from the UAGA.43 The case law interpreting the provisions of
the UAGA relating to the determination of the time of death is non-
existent. The commentators are split along the same lines that formed
when Kansas passed its statute providing for alternative "definitions of
death." Those who believe that the courts should and will accept what
the medical profession declares to be the criterion for determining the
time of death oppose any legislation on the matter and support the
omission in the UAGA . 4 Those desiring the security of a stated legal
guideline advocate modification of the UAGA to provide for procedures
M'UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, as proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws on July 30, 1968; e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-220.1 to -220.11 (Supp. 1971).
"'Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 817 (1970).
"The UAGA provides for designation by the donor before his death of the use to which his
organs are to be put. If the deceased gave no consent prior to his death for the removal of his
organs the Act lists the priority by which the next of kin can give consent after the death of the
donor. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AT § 2(b).
1UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7, Comment; see Smith & Smith, Kansas and the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 569, 574 (1971).
4 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220.7(b) (Supp. 1971).
43Letter from Taylor, supra note 9.
"See, e.g., American College of Cardiology, supra note 5, at 908 (stating that the subject was
correctly treated in the UAGA); Sommer, Additional Thoughts On the Legal Problems of Heart
Transplants, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J. 196, 199 (1969) (definition of death must ultimately be determined
by physicians); cf. Comment, Suggested Revisions to Clarify the Uncertain Impact of Section 7
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on Determination of Death, 11 ARIz. L. REV. 749 (1969)
(predicting that the courts will allow the medical profession to use any reasonable standard in
determining death).
19721
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for determining the time of death. 5
An important issue common to both the debate over the need for
the Kansas statute and the debate over the wisdom of omitting a defini-
tion of death from the UAGA is whether courts consider the standard
for determining the time of death to be an issue of law or fact." There
are actually two standards the courts must consider: first, the criterion
for determining if death has occurred, that is, the stage in the decline
of life at which the medical profession declares or is allowed to declare
a person dead, and, second, the clinical tests to be used in determining
if the death criterion has been met.47 In determining the first standard,
several questions are presented. First, a decision must be reached
whether to recognize, in certain circumstances, criteria other than the
traditional cessation of heart beat and respiration. If the traditional
criteria are outmoded, as most of the medical profession claims," is
'
5 Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 488 (1969); Comment, Medico-Legal Problems with the Question of Death, 5
CALIF. W.L. REV. 110, 122 (1968); Note, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV., supra note 9, at 155.
"The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, which set forth clinical criteria to
be used in diagnosing irreversible coma in 1968, assumed that the issue would be determined by
expert medical testimony and took a stance opposed to legislation in the area, as follows:
In this report, however, we suggest that responsible medical opinion is ready to
adopt new criteria for pronouncing death to have occurred in an individual sustaining
irreversible coma as a result of permanent brain damage. If this position is adopted by
the medical community, it can form the basis for change in the current legal concept of
death. No statutory change in the law should be necessary since the law treats this
question essentially as one of fact to be determined by physicians.
Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra
note 1, at 339.
47Heretofore, as seen in the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-25 supra, courts
apparently have relied upon the medical profession for these criteria. Now that there has been a
defacto adoption by the members of the medical profession of the brain death definition it remains
to be seen whether the courts will continue to rely upon expert medical testimony in establishing a
new death standard.
"S"The death of a person occurs when the brain is totally and irreversibly damaged and
nonfunctioning; many other tissues may still be viable and functioning." American College of
Cardiology, supra note 5, at 908. Beecher, After the "Definition of Irreversible Coma," 281 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1070 (1969), alleges that the definition of irreversible coma as set down in the
Harvard Report of 1968 has been widely accepted. Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplantation,
55 A.B.A.J. 629, 631 (1969), reveals that many physicians have based their criteria for diagnosis
of cerebral death on lesser considerations than suggested by the Harvard Report and have trans-
planted hearts of those still having spontaneous respiration. See also Harvard Medical School Ad
Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra note 1; Task Force on Death
and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Refinements in Criteria for
the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A. 48 (1972) (approving of the death criteria
established by the Harvard Report of 1968); Comment, 5 CALIF. W.L. REv., supra note 45, at
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"brain death" or irreversible coma to be the stage in a patient's decline
at which he may be declared dead even though he exhibits normal
(though mechanically maintained) respiration and heart beat? Kansas
has responded in the affirmative to this initial question.49 Second, if a
change is to be made in the legally recognized death criteria, should the
change be by legislative enactment or should the courts make the change
by relying upon expert medical testimony? And if the decision is made
to allow the courts to make the change in criteria by relying upon
medical testimony, should the court acknowledge the medical realities
as a matter of law or as a matter of fact-that is, should the judge
instruct the jury as to what is the standard for death-determination, or
should the jury be allowed, as in Tucker, to decide as a matter of fact
in each case what the recognized standard is to be?
However the change is effected, a decision must be made regarding
the clinical means used to determine if the acknowledged point at which
death legally occurs has been reached. If, as in Kansas, absence of
spontaneous brain function is adopted by statute as the point at which
death can be legally declared, what clinical indicators of this state are
to be recognized? What clinical indicators are sufficiently reliable to
make it legally permissible for a surgeon to declare an artificially respir-
ated person dead? Some committees of the medical profession have
proposed certain criteria based upon simple clinical observations. 0
Other members of the profession would place principal reliance on the
absence of electrical brain activity as recorded by an electroence-
phalogram.5t It is obvious that acceptable means must be developed to
insure against premature transplants. Are these clinical criteria to be
121 (present medical definition of death alleged to entail the irreversible loss of neural function);
Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 34, at 137-38.
"KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); see note 31 supra for the full text of the statute.
50For example, the following is a brief sketch of the criteria set forth in the Report of the
Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra
note 1: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally applied stimuli and inner need; (2) no
spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration; (3) no elicitable brain reflexes; and
(4) flat electroencephalogram. In addition, the report suggests that the above findings again be
verified on a repeat testing at least 24 hours later, and that the existence of hypothermia and central
nervous system depressants be excluded. It is also recommended that if the criteria are fulfilled
the patient be declared dead before the respirator is disconnected.
5'Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112-14 (1964). Recently, however, it has been
concluded that a majority of neurologists have rejected the proposition that EEG determinations
are sufficient as the sole basis for a determination of death. Task Force on Death and Dying of
the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, supra note 48, at 53.
1972]
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required by statute? The Kansas statute makes no reference to the
means by which the attending physician is to determine if there is an
absence of spontaneous brain function.5 2 Is the judge to instruct the jury
on the basis of expert medical testimony, or should the jury be allowed
to choose among the clinical means presented?
It would seem to be imperative, because of the legal and social
consequences, that the time of death be ascertainable by the application
of absolute and unchanging criteria.53 Thus, it should not be within the
province of the jury to determine at what stage one ceases to live. Nor
should it be within the jury's power to select the technical indicators to
be employed in determining if that stage was reached. These decisions
are of such great social importance that they should not be left to the
vagaries of jury deliberations. The multitude of problems that would
arise if the jury were permitted to select the criteria for determining the
time of death is obvious.-4
One of the significant aspects of Tucker is that the judge considered
the issue of what criteria were to be used in determining the time of
death to be one of fact to be decided by the jury. In the instruction
dealing with the time of death,5 the jury was allowed to choose the
applicable criteria from several elements provided by the court (from
expert medical testimony presented). The major choice presented to the
jury was between the traditional criterion on the one hand-the cessa-
tion of heart beat and respiration-and the complete and irreversible
loss of all brain function on the other. This is the first case in which an
American trial judge has allowed the jury to consider loss of brain
function as a criterion for determining the time of death. However, even
though the jury was not instructed to consider the medical testimony
controlling," the jury did adopt the brain death standard presented by
expert medical testimony, and the practice of relying upon the medical
profession for the standard of death was thus continued.
2KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
53Halley & Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423, 425 (1968),
suggest that conflicts between the medical and legal definitions of death should be resolved through
an interprofessional co-operative effort.
*'The kind of problems that would result is exemplified by the possibility of having one jury
declare a heart donor alive at the time of the transplantation while another jury found the same





There was no instruction to the jury as to the clinical means to be
employed in determining whether the death standard, as selected by the
jury, had been met.57 Thus the court also allowed the jury to determine,
as an issue of fact, whether the clinical tests employed by the defendants
in reaching their diagnosis of brain death were sufficient to safeguard
against premature transplantation. Physicians performing transplanta-
tions on patients still exhibiting mechanically maintained vital signs
(heart beat and respiration) are less likely to be subject to malpractice
and wrongful death liability if the medical profession's death standard
is followed by the juries. The judge's instructions and the jury verdict
reached thereon are consistent with the provisions of the UAGA, which
leaves the determination of the time of death to the attending or certify-
ing physician. Total reliance is placed upon the judgment of the physi-
cian. The death-criteria instruction given in Tucker is very similar in
substance to the Kansas statute which allows "alternative definitions of
death." Both allow the "brain death criteria" to be used if supporting
medical evidence has been given. Also, both make no mention of the
clinical tests to be applied in verifying the diagnosis of "brain death."
One major difference is that the Kansas statute makes the death criteria
a matter of law whereas in Tucker it was a matter of fact. Another
difference is that the Kansas statute requires a person to be declared
dead if either of the legal standards are met, whereas in Tucker the jury
was given much greater discretion in its determination of death. Thus
Tucker has broken the precedent established by the cases relying upon
Black's Law Dictionary for death-determining criteria and has nar-
rowed the gap between medical reality and legal cognizance in the area
of transplant surgery.
CONCLUSIONS
Two general conclusions may be drawn concerning the effect of
Tucker on previous law. First, the case re-emphasizes the role of the
medical profession in the determination of death. Through the jury's
acceptance of the expert medical testimony, the medical profession was
allowed to dictate, as a matter of fact, when death occurs and by what
clinical tests this determination is to be made. Although the law has
little expertise in the field of clinical diagnostics, as the guardian of
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social welfare it does have expertise in the field of social policy. That
is, the criteria for determining the time of death should not be a factual
issue to be decided by the jury in each case but, instead, should be a
socially accepted statement of the law, duly responding to medical ad-
vancements but not completely controlled by a purported consensus of
medical science.58
Second, by recognizing brain death as a possible means for deter-
mining the time of death, the Tucker case, like the Kansas statute,
acknowledges medical realities. Since the appearance of the Harvard
Report,5' which stated the "brain death" criteria in 1968, there has been
general acceptance by the medical profession that one is dead when his
brain is not functioning and his respiration is not spontaneous." Again,
the medical need for transplant organs and the social need for protecting
potential donors from premature transplantation are not issues to be
resolved by exclusive reliance upon the medical profession.
While the medical profession would doubtless approve of the ver-
dict reached in Tucker, the death criteria and the clinical tests applied
to indicate the satisfaction of these criteria are questions too socially
important to be considered factual issues to be decided by a jury. Since
there is no legal precedent for the courts to follow in establishing death
criteria to be employed in the transplant context, the various legislatures
of the states should recognize the dilemma with which the courts and
physicians are faced and should return to the pronouncement of death
the much needed characteristic of finality.
RICHMOND STANFIELD FREDERICK II
Separation of Powers-The Suspended Sentence
Every day more than one hundred and fifty Americans are killed
in automobile accidents.' Over half of these fatalities involve alcohol-
uThere are other problems with which law-makers will have to grapple in this complex area
of transplantation. Who is to decide how the limited number of available organs is to be distributed
for transplantation? Are physicians to be given absolute freedom to determine who is to live and
who is to die? When human resources are to be allocated, who is to exercise the ultimate control?
Unfortunately, discussion of these issues is beyond the limitations of this note.
5 Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
supra note I.
"See authorities cited note 48, supra.
'McDowell, How Phoenix Gets Drunks Off the Road, READER'S DIGEST, Feb. 1972, at 52.
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